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When major corporations build and manage own 
platforms, most of the conflicts are resolved internally. 
With the rise of blockchain systems, also blockchain-
based platforms are increasingly tried out, which are 
governed in a decentralized fashion. But moving from 
hierarchical efficiency to a democratic inclusiveness, in 
which blockchain proponents believe, is difficult: the 
variety of included actors raise a variety of conflicts, 
when platform users become platform complementors 
or even owners. To manage these conflicts, it is neces-
sary to analyze each actor in detail. This paper reflects 
on the developments within an ongoing enterprise 
blockchain consortium in a small European country in 
the automotive domain from a governance perspective. 
We portray the consortium’s stakeholder conflicts, pro-
pose solutions for these conflicts and relate them to lit-
erature on blockchain governance. Our findings contex-
tualize several theoretical stances, emphasizing the im-
portance of the organizational over the technological 
embedment in blockchain governance. 
1. Introduction  
With Bitcoin celebrating its tenth anniversary, 
blockchain technology continues to attract significant 
attention in both academia and practice. Thereby, block-
chain technology evolved from an enabler from crypto-
currencies to a novel architecture of organizing, trans-
acting, and sharing data in a decentralized manner [1]. 
This high level of interest in practice is particularly re-
flected in the growing number of blockchain consortia 
[2]. In such a consortium, as one instance of an inter-
organizational (IO) collaboration, different companies 
join forces to mutually develop, maintain, and run a 
blockchain-based system. Main drivers for these efforts 
are, among others, promises for novel products, process 
efficiencies, or greater customer intimacy [3]. These 
promises, however, are not new, as previous research on 
IO collaboration shows. Reasons like missing manage-
ment commitment, mistrust, or vested interests are 
prominent [4]. Dealing with these makes the manage-
ment and alignment of stakeholder a crucial component.  
Blockchain systems, on first sight, stand at odd with 
concepts like stakeholder management. In their early 
days, the governance of blockchain systems like 
Bitcoin, which is one of the most prominent blockchain 
systems to date, followed principles known from the 
free-and-open-source software (FOSS) development 
domain. In these, actors are mostly independent from 
each other, tend to stay anonymous, and not bound to a 
particular version of software. These principles make 
stakeholder alignment methods known from the corpo-
rate domain unfeasible. However, blockchains differ 
from FOSS as blockchains rely on a mutual dependence 
of software developers, maintainers, and other third par-
ties to assure the system’s continuity, security, and also 
its token’s value [5, 6]. And this mutual dependence has 
a caveat: the inability to manage these stakeholders’ in-
terests repeatedly threatened blockchain systems, most 
famously Bitcoin [7]. Alternative governance concept 
were tried out [8, 9], which led to the emergence of de-
centralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) [10] and 
blockchain consortia. Here, we focus on the latter, 
which account for network-type settings based on reci-
procity, a varying degree of trust, and known actors.  
Several researchers call for research on stakehold-
ers of blockchain systems [9, 11, 12], as an improved 
understanding of stakeholders is a prerequisite to man-
age potential conflicts and, thus, contribute to a better 
blockchain governance. This paper contributes to these 
calls by exploring stakeholder interests, conflicts, and 
possible ways of managing these with a focus on block-
chain consortia. To do so, we report from our involve-
ment in a blockchain consortium in the automotive in-
dustry in a small European country, called “CarCon” 
(anonymized). There, we designed and later strove to 
improve CarCon’s governance. A necessary step to do 
so has been to understand, what (1) stakeholder conflicts 
there were and (2) how these potentially could be re-
solved. We utilized various data sources, such as official 
project meeting minutes, notes taken as participant-ob-





server throughout the project duration, as well as 8 in-
terviews with senior stakeholders from the project. Even 
though blockchain consortia operate differently from 
public and permissionless blockchains like Bitcoin, we 
believe several conflicts to overlap because of a block-
chain’s characteristics, as we will argue below. Our re-
search was led by the following research questions: 
RQ 1: Which stakeholder conflicts can be ob-
served within CarCon? 
RQ 2: How could these conflicts be resolved by a 
Blockchain Governance? 
RQ 3: How do these conflicts and resolutions re-
late to Blockchain Governance? 
This paper is organized as follows: we outline re-
lated work in the following section. After detailing our 
methodology, we introduce the case of CarCon. Then, 
we show central stakeholder conflicts within CarCon 
and possible resolutions to these. In the discussion, we 
relate observed stakeholder conflicts to blockchain gov-
ernance literature. We conclude by outlining its limita-
tions and showing potential venues for future research. 
2. Related Work 
This section highlights related work on modes of 
governance, blockchain governance and its evolution, 
and shows the importance of a stakeholder-oriented 
view on blockchains.  
2.1. Markets, Hierarchies, Networks, and 
Online Modes of Governance 
At its core, governance describes how order be-
tween different parties is established [13]. Dealing with 
stakeholders, i.e., in terms of conflict resolution, is 
highly contingent on the mode of governance – or order 
– in which (trans-) actions take place. Modes of govern-
ance can be classified into hierarchies (control and au-
thority) and markets (price and free choices) [14]. The 
network mode of governance extends this dichotomy by 
introducing a relational view on actors, which share a 
common goal, and whose collaboration is based on rec-
iprocity [15]. These modes of governance do not ac-
count for online phenomena, such as commons-based 
peer production [16]. FOSS is an instance of the latter, 
and several authors argue that blockchain systems have 
their roots in these [8]. FOSS is typically characterized 
by no central steering entity, use of open licenses to pro-
mote co-development, and informal relations among ac-
tors [17]. Thereby, FOSS stands as an example of how 
established governance mechanisms, and thereby stake-
holder management, are altered by technology. For ex-
ample, hierarchical control becomes unfeasible, due to 
its “structurelessness” [18], open licenses are limiting  
clear property rights, which are necessary for markets, 
and relational contracting is hindered by anonymity. 
This is in line with several authors who argue block-
chains to alter existing [19] or to constitute new [8] 
forms of governance, which affects stakeholder relation-
ships and stakeholder management. 
2.2. Fundamentals of Blockchain Systems 
As this paper focuses on blockchain governance in 
terms of stakeholder conflicts, technical details of a 
blockchain system are only introduced to the extent they 
are necessary. We define blockchain systems as a 
“blockchain application and (its) organizational embed-
ment” [1]. Blockchains rely on the principles of ano-
nymity, persistency, auditability, and decentralization 
[20]. These principles depend on the applied blockchain 
type. An important concept to blockchains are so-called 
smart contracts, which, in layman’s terms, constitute en-
coded, self-enforcing business logic [21], which is often 
linked to reduction of transaction costs. Automation de-
pends on deterministic inputs, evaluation criteria, and 
outputs; as a result, smart contracts are well-suited for 
routine tasks with predictable outcomes, but ill-suited 
for personalized tasks with unknown outcomes [21]. 
The most common and researched blockchain type 
to date refers to public and permissionless blockchains, 
such as Bitcoin [22]. In contrast, mostly so-called pri-
vate and permissioned blockchains [23] are tried out in 
blockchain consortia. In these, various use-cases are 
tried out [24], for example, in supply chain tracking 
[25], land registration and transfer [26], and many oth-
ers. One has to differentiate business blockchain consor-
tia, such as the latter, from technology-oriented consor-
tia, such as Hyperledger [27]. Our study focuses on one 
instance of a business blockchain consortium. We de-
fine the latter as an IO network of multiple companies 
working together toward a common purpose utilizing 
blockchain technology (adapted from Popp et al. [28]). 
2.2. Stakeholder Conflicts and Blockchain-
based Systems 
The alignment of stakeholders is repeatedly consid-
ered central for successful projects [29]. To strengthen 
this alignment, literature streams such as Project Man-
agement offer helpful tools, such as weighted decision 
matrices  or organizational design analysis [30]. These 
tools proved helpful in the corporate domain, in which 
bureaucratic control can be applied. But even in these, 
researchers have repeatedly unfolded the complexity of 
internalities of companies, where stakeholder manage-
ment has been seen as a fundamental activity for project 
success [29]. In contrast, bureaucratic control becomes 
unfeasible in inter-organizational (IO) networks [15], 
Page 4612
where parties work together as long as benefits succeed 
costs: reasons for IO networks to form can vary, from 
access to and leveraging of resources, seamless service 
quality and coordination, mutual learning through 
knowledge exchange, innovation, or sharing risks [28, 
31]. Consequently, IO networks are often found to be 
hindered or even failing due various reasons such as cul-
tural clashes or power imbalances [28], or missing align-
ment of stakeholder interests [32]. These stakeholder in-
terests can vary greatly: from business conflicts on com-
petition within or outside a consortium [28], or regula-
tory conflicts [33]. To meet these challenges, it is vital 
to obtain a detailed understanding of these organiza-
tional arrangements [28, 34], especially in regard to the 
novelties blockchains bring. Seebacher and Schüritz 
[34] contrasted known challenges in IO information sys-
tems implementation against challenges brought for-
ward by blockchain technology: while the majority of 
challenges are similar, they conclude, that blockchain’s 
promise of decentralization – especially on an organiza-
tional level – stands contrary to IO practices, where cen-
tral stakeholders eventually build their own hierarchy 
due to their higher negotiation power [35].  
Complementary to a transaction-cost-centric view, 
principle-agent conflicts [36, 37] add an additional per-
spective on stakeholder conflicts. At its core, it deals 
with one party (principal) delegating work to another 
(agent), and possible conflicts among these, such as di-
verging goals or attitudes towards risk [37]. Principle-
Agent conflicts can be resolved in several ways, such as 
direct supervision, lowering information asymmetries, 
establishing shared values, or proper incentivation [37]. 
Similarly, in blockchain systems, several of these are 
being applied: for example, central operations, such as 
mining, place incentives to assure honest mining behav-
ior, and information asymmetries are lowered through 
publicly visible transactions or change proposals [38]. 
Aside from the blockchain system operation, a central 
principle-agent conflict in the blockchain domain re-
volves around the inability of users to assess ongoing 
developments around a project [7]: often, change pro-
posals are written in technical terms, which necessitates 
knowledge on technicalities, which users might lack. 
Consequently, users, at least to a certain degree, must 
trust core developers to act honestly, while having lim-
ited means to assess their work. This centrality of tech-
nical knowledge but also on technical decision rights is 
discussed widely in blockchain governance literature [7, 
10] and seen controverse, as it stands contrary of the 
principles of decentralization blockchains originated 
from. 
 
1 Please note, that CarCon started as an innovation project, which 
lasted from spring 2017 until November 2019; in April 2019, CarCon 
Phenomena such as FOSS development, reintro-
duced a logic based on a gift economy rather than mar-
ket principles [39]. A central reason for the gift econ-
omy to work was that one’s use did not affect another’s 
– facilitated by marginal replication costs, cheap com-
putational power, and a widely-accessible network [5]. 
Blockchains differ in their mode of governance from 
FOSS due to the mutual dependence of actors on one 
specific version of software at a time [5, 8]. Conse-
quently, the idea of developing and maintaining a shared 
resource – in this instance: a shared information infra-
structure – emphasizes the so-called “tragedy of the 
commons” [40] within the digital domain. The tragedy 
of the commons was first conceptualized in the 1840ies 
[41] and later became central in Nobel Laurate Elinor 
Ostrom’s work [42] “Governing the Commons”. Its un-
derlying problem refers to a shared-resource setting, in 
which actors spoil the commons through opportunistic 
action, thus, working for own instead of shared interest. 
Hardin [43], in his own interpretation of the tragedy of 
the commons, labeled such behavior as “privatizing 
profit and socializing losses”. Possible resolutions to the 
tragedy of the commons refer to assigning property 
rights to commons, which effectively privatizes com-
mons, top-down regulation (e.g., a regulator defines 
rules of using the commons per actor), which re-intro-
duces principle-agent problems, or the development of 
a collective action agreement (e.g., parties agree on rules 
for common usage among themselves) [42].  
The role of commons in blockchain-based systems 
is already being explored in academia by several authors 
[44 - 46]: Rozas et al. [45] identified affordances, such 
as tokenization or transparentizing, brought forward by 
blockchain technology and discussed them against 
Ostrom’s principles for commons governance [42], 
while Calcaterra [44] explores DAOs’ governance 
through the lens of Ostrom’s principles. Shackelford & 
Meyers [46] study Ostrom’s principles through the lens 
of the governance of – instead of by – blockchains.  
While these works focus on rather public and per-
missionless blockchains, it remains unclear, if there are 
differences to business blockchain consortia. This is rel-
evant, as blockchain consortia also constitute by defini-
tion a shared-resource setting in blockchain develop-
ment and maintenance.  
3. Methodology 
This paper reports on findings from a project called 
CarCon1, in which the authors were involved as research 
partners. The research team has been involved from the 
founded the CarCon Association as separate legal body to continue to 
advance CarCon after the innovation project’s completion. 
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project’s initial idea in spring 2017 until the innovation 
project’s end in March 2020. In this time, the research 
team worked on operational (e.g., business analysis) as 
well as strategic (e.g., founding of a legal body) matters; 
these tasks allowed us to gain a concise understanding 
on the ongoings within the projects from different per-
spectives, as well as the access to an extensive docu-
mentation of meeting notes throughout the project.  
This research is designed as an action research fol-
lowing the methodology proposed by Baskerville  [47] 
and focuses on CarCon’s governance. More specifi-
cally, this research focuses on fall 2019, when it became 
apparent, that a more advanced governance concept for 
CarCon became necessary (diagnosing; see results sec-
tion). The research team, together with practitioners, in-
itiated a focus group [48], agreed upon a scope and pro-
ject activities to be conducted by the group to evaluate 
the current governance concepts, where it falls short, 
and how it can be improved (action planning). Due to 
space limitations, within this paper, we only focus on 
stakeholder conflicts and proposed resolutions for these, 
and not on other parts of the developed governance con-
cept. As for the first cycle of action taking, we applied 
a simplified stakeholder analysis model adapted from 
Smith [49] and Cleland [50], which analyzes stakehold-
ers along the dimensions of their influence on the pro-
ject, each stakeholder’s importance of the project, and 
their main interests for participating in the project. We 
applied this model for each stakeholder based on notes 
taken from in-person discussions, triweekly project 
meetings, quarterly meetings of the strategic committee, 
and the official project documentation and meeting 
minutes. Then (evaluating, cycle 1), we validated our 
initial stakeholder analysis with eight senior project 
stakeholders as part of semi-structured expert interviews 
[51]. The set of interviewees consisted mainly of parties 
involved from the beginning on. During the interview, 
we asked every stakeholder to evaluate and argue the 
importance of the project, influence on the project, per-
ceived conflicts, and interests for his respective organi-
zation but also for other stakeholders and among these. 
This allowed us not only to evaluate most of the stake-
holders’ views on their own involvement, but also to ob-
tain valuable insights on how stakeholders viewed each 
other. Our interviews yielded over 12 hours of audio 
material, which were transcribed and coded as a prepa-
ration for the second cycle of action taking. For the lat-
ter, we utilized the obtained feedback from the expert 
interviews for a consequent elaboration of a proposal for 
a to-be governance concept. As part of this (action tak-
ing, cycle 2), we extended our initial stakeholder analy-
sis by categorizing perceived conflicts into conflict cat-
egories (competition, principle-agent, commons vs. pri-
vates, and regulatory conflicts), conflict areas (subcate-
gories), conflicts, and initial proposals on how these 
could be dealt with (see results); this categorization re-
lated our findings to associated concepts and theories 
from academic literature. As this categorization is based 
on our empirical analysis instead of academic frame-
works, it allows us to argue its relevance for blockchain 
consortia such as CarCon. As a last step (evaluating, 
cycle 2), the focus group evaluated our stakeholder anal-
ysis, derived conflicts, and proposed solutions for these 
conflicts. After taking obtained feedback into account 
and reworking our governance proposal, this engage-
ment phase has been concluded with an official hando-
ver of our results to CarCon. This paper documents the 
established link of our results the theoretical contribu-
tions of our action research (specifying learning). Table 
1. below summarizes our applied methodology. 




Improved governance needed due to problems 
in practice, as seen in operational and strategic 
meetings; participant observation [52] 
Action 
Planning 
Research and practitioner set up a focus group 
[48], project scope, and project activities (con-
stituents of governance concept as described 
below) to be conducted by focus group. 
Action 
Taking 
Cycle 1: Stakeholder analysis, review of the 
current governance concept, application of an 
IT governance framework, and conceptualizing 
a proposal of a to-be governance concept. 
Cycle 2: Rework of governance concept. Tran-
scription of interview recordings, rough coding 
centering around stakeholder interests and im-
provements to our proposal. 
Evaluating 
Cycle 1: Evaluation with eight senior stake-
holders within semi-structured expert inter-
views [51]. 
Cycle 2: Reworked governance proposal eval-
uation with three subject-matter experts in a 
dedicated focus group [48] 
Specifying 
Learning 
Hand-over of our findings to organization.  
Theoretical contribution worked out by re-
search team within this paper. 
4. Case Description: Towards a Blockchain 
within CarCon  
In the following, we first introduce the case of Car-
Con and its related stakeholders. Then, we show ob-
served stakeholder conflicts and relate them to possible 
resolutions. Thereby, this section answers research 
question one and two. 
4.1. Introduction to CarCon: Overall Idea and 
Governance Evolution 
CarCon was initiated in 2018 and deals with a con-
sortium of several major stakeholders in the car ecosys-
tem in a small European country. This consortium is led 
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by the vision of lowering the information asymmetry be-
tween buyers and sellers of cars in the used-car market, 
which refers to the work of Nobel laurate Akerlof [53]. 
To do so, as shown in Figure 1. below, CarCon is imple-
menting a blockchain-based system to store car-related 
data over a car’s lifecycle, from its import to its wreck-
ing. Data, together with basic functionalities, are pro-
vided in the infrastructural layer. This infrastructure is 
then utilized to power so-called “dapps” (decentralized 
applications), which represent use cases developed 
within the consortium. While the infrastructural layer 
and some dapps belong to the commons, dapps can also 
be developed by and for oneself (private). Lastly, a dapp 
needs to be integrated into the stakeholder’s system. In 
general, CarCon beliefs a blockchain-based system to 
allow for (1) new product offerings, such as an algorith-
mically verified car history (CarCon dossier), (2) digit-
izing existing processes among members in the car eco-
system, allowing for operational excellence, and (3) 
higher customizability of existing products, such as in-
dividualized and automatically enforced car insurances 
[3]. While some of these can be realized by infor-
mation/process integration among few parties, central to 
CarCon is the complete CarCon dossier, which can be 
seen as one instance of dapps. The value of such a dos-
sier depends widely on the integrity, reliability, and 
completeness about information of a car [8]. This, how-
ever, is difficult to obtain, as a car encompasses numer-
ous actors over its lifecycle, such as insurances, state 
agencies, or various owners. Consequently, information 
about a car is structurally fragmented and maintained in-
consistently, which leads to various “truths” of a car.  
Figure 1. Overall functioning of CarCon 
To achieve a minimal viable car record, from the 
onset on, the consortium was planned to cover major 
stakeholder of different roles within the ecosystem. 
Choosing not to include competitors early on allowed 
CarCon to avoid potential conflicts while maintaining 
pace. At the beginning, CarCon consisted of several in-
dustry stakeholders, such as a mobility service provider 
(CarShare), a road traffic agency (RTA), a major im-
porter and repair shop (CarImport1), and a major insurer 
(CarInsurer1), who contribute their domain expertise 
and data to CarCon. In addition to these, the initial con-
sortium included a large software company (ITConsult), 
a team of legal experts (PrivacyUni), and us as the re-
search team (ResearchUni). Several other parties, such 
as CarImport2, joined the consortium shortly after its le-
gal body was founded. Note, that several other CarCon 
stakeholders were not part of our analysis, as they joined 
either at the time of our analysis or later. 
4.2. Exploring Stakeholder Conflicts within 
CarCon 
In the following, we explore the stakeholder con-
flicts within CarCon one by one along the four main 
identified areas of competition, principle-agent, regula-
tory, and commons conflicts. For each of these, we show 
our proposed resolutions to these. 
Competition Conflicts. Several of CarCon’s stake-
holders stand in direct competition within and around 
CarCon. We categorized these conflicts into market, re-
search, and IT competition. As for market competition, 
several actors compete outside of CarCon in their own 
respective core business (e.g., CarImport and CarIm-
port2), others in complementary but similar product of-
ferings (e.g., CarCon and CarImport). To mitigate prob-
lems arising from these conflicts, we proposed several 
measures: (1) each stakeholder can declare conflicts of 
interest on a specific form, available to seen by all par-
ties of CarCon, which increases the transparency of a 
stakeholder’s action. For example, CarImporter1 ran a 
project like CarCon’s internally and disclosed it to Car-
Con early on. (2) Further, if stakeholders would fail to 
settle a conflict amongst themselves, a so-called fairness 
board allocated within CarCon would arbitrate as a neu-
tral third party. Thereby, it would enforce an agreed-
upon code-of-conduct, comprising fundamental rules 
and procedures how these conflicts should be dealt with. 
(3) Lastly, CarCon should allow to accommodate pri-
vate (exclusive) workstreams, which allows stakehold-
ers to work on own solutions, e.g., own, novel products 
or efficiency-enhancing systems. 
As for research competition, two conflicts were 
mentioned: (1) competition on research funds offered by 
CarCon or individual stakeholders (e.g., for specific 
workstreams) between ResearchUni, PrivacyUni, or 
others, and (2) the conflict of relevance for theory and 
practice, related to the question of what research specif-
ically should be funded, as businesses may have limited 
interest in funding research without tangible, business-
oriented outcomes. We proposed to tender research 
grants publicly within CarCon, where research partners 
would compete for these. CarCon-related research 
grants would then be decided within CarCon’s steering 
committee – funding of individual research projects is 
naturally subject to agreement between a research part-
ner and the respective CarCon member. 
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Lastly, competition on IT revolved around alloca-
tion of decision rights regarding development and oper-
ation of IT. These decisions rights are financially attrac-
tive, as they may result in a high dependence on one IT 
provider, which also benefits from gained know-how, 
which can then be applied to other projects. This conflict 
has not been prevalent within CarCon, as we focused on 
getting the system itself to run. For its future govern-
ance, however, to avoid being dependent on one single 
IT provider, we proposed to (1) install a central IT steer-
ing committee, which holds major decision rights from 
an architectural perspective, (2) introduce a dedicated IT 
partner management as an organizational function 
within CarCon, which coordinates between the IT part-
ners, and to (3) tender architectural functionalities to all 
IT partners to be decided upon by CarCon.  
Principle-Agent Conflicts. We observed three prin-
ciple-agent conflicts, which we characterized as cus-
tomer-supplier conflicts as detailed in the following. 
Our first observed principle-agent conflict revolves 
around the missing ability of members to assess IT pro-
viders in terms of their actions, e.g., system planning, 
development, operation, or maintenance. Complemen-
tary to the previous conflict on know-how and funds, 
this conflict revolves around the centrality IT providers 
inhere, and the consequent dependence upon their 
judgement, i.e., how to design the overall system. In-
stead of putting the consortium’s interest first, IT pro-
viders might be inclined to make technological choices 
to their benefit, e.g., to lock-in clients in their techno-
logical eco-system. We proposed to deal with this con-
flict with means of supervision provided by an IT steer-
ing committee, where major architectural decisions are 
allocated, and a dedicated technology management, 
which aligns all IT providers. To assure transparency of 
technical choices and proposals, the development of ar-
chitectural functionalities (not dapps or individual solu-
tions) should be tendered among IT providers and de-
cided upon in the CarCon steering committee. 
Another conflict targets the provision and sharing 
of data itself. Naturally, several stakeholders inhere 
more data about a car than others, while others might 
depend on specific datasets to realize a desired dapp. 
Stakeholders can consequently be classified into being 
primarily data sources or data sinks. As part of a data 
market governance, as we propose, it is necessary to 
counter monopolies of data (only one party inheres data) 
with lowering the dependence on these parties by, e.g., 
relying on data from complementors, for example, car 
users. Of course, this is not possible in all cases. 
For last, data consumers cannot assess the quality 
of data provided by data providers. There are several 
ways, how this can be handled, e.g., in compensating 
data provision or opening channels to report false data, 
or even triangulating data between more reliable data 
sources. All of these are part of a dedicated data market 
governance, which we suggested to implement. 
Regulatory Conflicts. We saw two conflict areas 
regarding regulatory conflicts: supervisory and sectorial 
conflicts. As for supervisory conflicts, the RTA found 
itself in a conflict with CarImport, as the RTA, due to 
antitrust laws, cannot favor any for-profit party over oth-
ers. This necessitated full transparency of the RTA’s ac-
tions and proper external communication; if only the 
perception would be established, that RTA would favor 
a for-profit party, the RTA would have to leave CarCon. 
For the same reason, referring to its sectorial conflict 
(public vs. private sector), the RTA can be involved in 
the development of dapps, but these dapps (and their 
corresponding workstreams) must be publicly accessi-
ble and transparent in terms of revenue. This contin-
gency excludes RTA’s involvement in promising, but 
private workstreams. Furthermore, state bodies can be 
involved in dapps targeting cost-coverage at best, but 
never for-profit workstreams; regulation, however, al-
lows for surpluses, which then are gathered and redis-
tributed within the state body. As some of these conflicts 
might be interpreted as inhibitors, an early alignment 
with regulatory entities, such as the RTA, legitimizes 
the consortium’s work and, consequently, can be seen 
as crucial for a project’s success [54]. 
Another conflict concerned the compliance of our 
system with given data protection laws. Fostering this 
compliance has been a central reason for PrivacyUni to 
join CarCon. To assess the degree of compliance of Car-
Con’s system, due to its complexity, PrivacyUni must 
rely on ITConsult’s assessment, at least to a certain de-
gree. We proposed to underline the importance of data 
compliance within CarCon by a close collaboration with 
CarCon’s compliance function with the development, 
making regular compliance checks important mile-
stones in the system development lifecycle. 
Commons and Privates. The last conflict area we 
observed regards the division between common (shared) 
and private goods. A core conflict refers to the privati-
zation of benefits, while costs are socialized. In other 
words: CarCon necessitates commons, e.g., a running 
infrastructure and basic functionalities, and most of our 
stakeholder necessitate these. However, from a temporal 
perspective, stakeholders are inclined to wait for others 
to develop commons. Furthermore, stakeholders could 
be inclined to transfer specific functionalities for own 
use to the commons because there all parties would 
share the costs. This is especially true for in-
workstream-developments and common functionalities. 
Every workstream entails development, adaption, or us-
age of CarCon’s transaction layer and its functionalities 
or ongoing transaction-layer-specific workstreams. We 
proposed to deal with this conflict by developing a tax 
scheme, which assigns weights for usage, development, 
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or adaption of the transaction layer and its functionali-
ties. This would allow us to discriminate between 
“light” and “heavy” usage, development, or adaption to 
achieve a fair distribution of costs. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to assign the responsibility of proving the 
function in question to belong to the commons to the 
workstreams. If this function would be commonly de-
veloped, the intellectual property (IP) rights would re-
main with CarCon, so its usage would be taxed. 
The conflict between commons and privates is also 
evident in the planning of the development pipeline. For 
example, the technology provider might develop certain 
features for another project of its own first, while Car-
Con would need certain features earlier. We proposed to 
deal with this conflict by enforcing transparency be-
tween ITConsult’s development pipeline as well as its 
pipeline for CarCon’s development; this would allow 
other parties to synchronize their development efforts in 
accordance with recent developments and, if crucial 
functions would have to be available earlier, the devel-
opment costs could be shared. It is also necessary to 
steer dapp development. While parties would want to 
develop dapps as they like, there must be a necessary 
quality and commonly shared standards. We therefore 
proposed to deal a dapp quality management and dapp 
admission process, which assesses (1) technical feasibil-
ity and (2) fit with CarCon’s strategy. 
For last, inhering complete and accurate record of 
car data is commonly desired, while individuals might 
omit entering or falsify data to their benefit. We pro-
posed therefore to develop incentive mechanisms to as-
sure data quality [55], instantiating a data quality man-
agement function, and linking CarCon’s data to its part-
ners’ operational systems (triangulation of data).  
5. Discussion 
The description of CarCon has shown a case of mu-
tually dependent actors. To answer research question 
three, a wider discussion follows, in which we relate our 
findings from the case of CarCon to the academic block-
chain governance discourse shown in the related work.  
Business Blockchain Consortia and their Mode of 
Governance. Chapter two shows that economic activity 
can be accommodated in markets, hierarchies, networks 
[14, 15], and outside of these [16]. Several authors argue 
that blockchain systems compete with these modes of 
governance, seeing blockchains as general-purpose 
technology [56], and referring to constituents of stake-
holders’ mutual dependency using the analogy of 
‘tribes’ [5]. Contrasting CarCon’s stakeholder conflicts, 
to which order must be established, shows a mismatch 
to these. To say the least, these modes of governance do 
not explain CarCon’s governance regarding no clear as-
signment of property rights and price is not the only 
governance mechanism employed (contrary to markets), 
bureaucratic control cannot be enforced (contrary to hi-
erarchies), there is, to a certain degree, mistrust among 
parties (contrary to networks), and parties are not anon-
ymous (contrary to ‘tribes’) or mutually-dependent 
(contrary to FOSS). Rather than trying to understand 
CarCon’s through one governance mode, we inspect 
CarCon’s conflicts, which need to be governed, and our 
proposed resolutions in the following. 
Inspecting Areas of Governance. Within CarCon, 
we have seen several principle-agent conflicts mani-
festing as customer-supplier conflicts. For all of these, 
we utilized existing literature to meet these (e.g., [37]), 
relying on means of supervision, decentralization of IT 
and data provision, or proper incentivation. What is re-
markable is that for most of these our hands were tied: 
we were only able to propose structures, which might 
prevent these conflicts to happen, instead of measures 
dealing with actual instances of these problems. This is 
because, in contrast to bureaucratic control, in a net-
work-like setting, authority has limits, and we can nar-
row down agents’ action spaces but hardly impose ac-
tions. For example, the development of a data market 
governance can incentivize good and punish bad behav-
ior regarding data provision. However, if an actor 
chooses to not report data which would be harmful to 
oneself, there are limited mechanisms CarCon could ap-
ply. This problem, in general, refers to the garbage-in 
garbage-out problem [57], in which blockchains are val-
uable in persisting data but unable to assess data inputs.  
As for conflicts between commons and privates, 
CarCon constitutes an artificial material commons, 
where a complex system, its infrastructure, and re-
sources are developed through peer production [58]. 
Creating an artificial commons, i.e. an infrastructure 
which not only benefits one-self, is a novel approach to 
business networks, in which information or process in-
tegration is frequently applied [59]. Within CarCon, we 
have observed several conflicts between commons and 
privates. Especially the conflict between privatizing 
benefits and socializing costs – to which the title of this 
paper refers – is prominent: even though we observed 
several parties to inhere a good understanding of bene-
ficiary business cases for themselves, these could not 
have been tried out as the necessary infrastructural layer 
was missing. Furthermore, a first mover would have had 
to finance commons – infrastructural functions to the 
benefit of everyone – on top of his own investment in 
the development of his dapp. Consequently, this partly 
led to a stalemate, where stakeholders wait for others to 
invest first. This conflict only serves as an example of 
the importance of culture in a network-setting, in which 
parties only collaborate to the degree it is beneficial for 
them; as a result, culture constrains strategy [60].  
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As for conflicts on competition, naturally, stake-
holders are free to leave a business network upon their 
liking. In a setting of mutually dependent actors, com-
petition conflicts can be constrained for the sake of com-
mon gains. For example, after time, several competing 
businesses, e.g., a second car importer, joined CarCon. 
Both importers’ rationale is that, despite competing for 
the same customers, there are value potentials, which 
benefit both – and eventually their customers. We ob-
served various of such conflicts, either within (similar 
products as CarCon) or outside (same business domain) 
of CarCon. In addition to these, there were conflicts on 
CarCon’s further development, either from a research or 
technological side. Our proposed solutions revolved 
around a culture of fairness, i.e., to make conflicts of in-
terest among parties explicit, or publicly tender any fur-
ther developments around CarCon and let elected super-
visory boards decide upon best fit. We were certain 
these measures to tackle the inherent informal networks 
in a business environment [61]. Consequently, the de-
centralization of major decision rights within CarCon 
has been central to the revisited governance concept in 
the second cycle of our action research. 
For last, regulation, in the sense of local laws and 
their application, have frequently been cited as a detri-
ment to blockchain adoption [62]. Consequently, collab-
orating with regulatory entities, CarCon has shown, how 
working alongside regulators can enhance CarCon’s 
success [54]. At the same time, the collaboration with 
regulatory entities shaped CarCon’s structure and oper-
ations, as regulatory entities cannot favor single parties 
over others, while their actions must be transparent, 
which effectively make them unsuitable contributors to 
a business’ private workstream. For last, because of 
many questions in the form of their collaboration, Car-
Con serves as an example of how regulatory functions, 
such as our proposed fairness board, compliance func-
tion, or business/IT steering committees are a result of a 
common regulatory process in the very sense of com-
mons governance [42], and how these were institution-
alized in an own legal body, the CarCon association.  
Building Common Ground. All these conflicts re-
quire own rules, on how they can be dealt with. Aside 
from these, there must be a rule-setting entity, which not 
only specifies these rules, but also provides rules for 
changing these rules if need arises. Furthermore, such 
an entity must also define the overall structure, e.g., 
which conflict is being dealt with in which realm or by 
which process. For most of these matters, within Car-
Con, the CarCon association has been responsible, 
providing common ground among its stakeholders. For 
some of these questions, counterintuitively, DAOs, can 
be helpful: to at least partly overcome opportunistic ac-
tions, hence, narrowing down an agent’s action space, 
DAOs encode various governance operations, such as 
decision-making or changing its underlying ruleset, 
“on-chain” utilizing smart contracts [10]. This is neces-
sary, as actors in such blockchains tend to stay pseudon-
ymous [5], which would entice opportunistic behavior, 
to which immutable smart contracts are a solution. But 
even in these systems, smart contracts cannot account 
for the formal and informal networks with “off-chain” 
procedures [38], which render smart contracts unneces-
sary. It is common among public blockchains to found 
legal bodies as point of reference to their communities 
(e.g., Bitcoin’s association). To assure that conflicts are 
met adequately, it is common to provide meta-structures 
of governance, which accommodate different kinds of 
decisions, e.g., in organizational or technical boards, 
which was also part of our work within CarCon.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper studies business blockchain consortia 
governance by examining stakeholder conflicts and pos-
sible resolutions to these. We discussed our findings 
against blockchain governance literature and distilled 
discussion points related to agency, regulation, com-
mons, and competition. As with every research, our re-
search is not free from limitations. First, even though we 
were part of CarCon since for over three years, our re-
search shows a snapshot of stakeholder conflicts. This is 
also due CarCon’s growth from initially 9 parties to over 
22 and counting. Even though we are certain cover cen-
tral stakeholder conflicts, it can be expected, that these 
new parties will bring new or alter stakeholder conflicts 
within CarCon. Furthermore, we cannot ensure the gen-
eralizability of our findings. We are confident, however, 
that CarCon resembles several features from a com-
mons-based blockchain consortium, which, at the very 
least, stands for a class of blockchain consortia.  
We see several future research opportunities. First, 
studying a consortium over time, with problems in prac-
tice, would yield greater detail on which resolutions 
work and which are altered by blockchain technology. 
Lastly, our findings in CarCon, show a gap between on-
chain functionalities, such as on-chain voting or re-
source allocation, which DAOs are heavily trying out. 
Understanding, when to encode which functionality, 
and criteria for these, might lead to a better understand-
ing on both governance of and through blockchains. 
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